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ABSTRACT
This paper not only addresses how linkages, direct and facilitating linkages, can benefit 
microfinance  institutions  –  and  particularly  in  jurisdictions  where  the  Savings  Group 
Outreach involvement is particularly low, but also illustrates ways and means whereby 
group lending and other more recent innovative methods used by micro lenders to secure 
repayments, could increase the desired effects, efficiency and impact of microfinance in 
selected  jurisdictions.  In  so  doing,  it  addresses  some  of  the  existing  and  persisting 
problems of micro finance in rural areas.
An innovative aspect of the paper is evidenced through its recommendation of the Micro-
Savings Requirement Scheme - which offers numerous benefits – as will be highlighted in 
this paper.
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1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN MICRO 
FINANCE
The basic issues underlying the impediments and challenges faced in microfinance relate 
particularly  to  those  presented  by  risk  and  asymmetric  information.  Risk  being  partly 
attributed  to  inavailability  of  collaterals  which  can  be  secured  by  micro  lenders  and 
asymmetric  information  which  also  partly  arises  as  a  result  of  adverse  selection.  Both 
features are well  known characteristics of financial regulation – the rationale for financial 
regulation being an embodiment of risk (that is, systemic risks) and asymmetric information. 
The type of risk associated with microfinance stems largely from uncertainty. Even though 
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risk and uncertainty are frequently used interchangeably, they are distinguished from each 
other based on their capability of being quantified. Risk is a term usually considered to be 
more capable of being quantified while uncertainty is also a form of risk which is to a larger 
extent,  considered  to  be  unquantifiable.1 Group  lending,  widely  acknowledged  to  be  an 
underlying and defining feature of microfinance, is an innovation which has been proposed 
to address the challenges relating to the need to facilitate repayments being made to the 
microlender whilst financial linkages have also evolved as a means of addressing problems 
presented from a lack of formal institutions operating within rural areas. 
1.1 Introduction
An array of approaches has been used in the African microfinance industry - ranging from 
traditional  group  based  systems  to  specialised  lending  by  banks,  by  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), non bank financial institutions, cooperatives, rural banks, savings and 
postal  financial  institutions.2 The majority of microfinance efforts and institutions in Africa 
operate  in  the  informal  sector  and  it  was  only  in  the  1990s,  with  the  intervention  of 
international cooperative movements and specialized NGOs that microfinance was able to 
reach more clients in Africa – such as the one million clients which exist in Ethiopia.3
Given the above statement, as well as figures (see Figure 1) and facts which support the 
evidence  that  a  huge  component  of  microfinance  activities  in  Africa  revolve  round  the 
informal sector,  the role of regulation immediately becomes apparent.  Without regulation, 
huge challenges are certainly and most likely to be presented to the microfinance industry in 
respect of the rationales for the embodiment of financial regulation – that is, issues relating 
to risks and information asymmetries.
According to Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,4 the absence of formal credit institutions in 
village economies is often attributed to agency problems5 – which are accentuated when 
individuals cannot offer seizable collateral,  and when legal enforcement mechanisms are 
weak.
The above statement  therefore  also illustrates the link  between the issue relating to  an 
inability to provide collaterals, as well as that relating to the agency problem of asymmetric 
information.  Even though such innovations as group lending and financial  linkages have 
gone a huge way to address underlying issues in microfinance, several inefficiencies in the 
form of high transaction costs (and a proper understanding of what resources and products 
1
1
Risk is traditionally associated with probability calculation – which suggests that an event can be 
predicted and controlled. Uncertainty, however, is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities  
incapable of calculation which are based on guesswork and judgement. (Gray and Hamilton, 2006:20)
2
2
(African Development Bank, 2006: v)
3
3
Ibid at page 3. Also see Adams et al, 1992.
4
4
(2005:36)
5
5
In this sense, three types of agency problems are presented by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,  
namely: Firstly, the lender having little if any, reliable information about the quality of the borrower (prior to 
extending a loan); secondly, once the grant of the loan has occurred, the lender does not know entirely how  
the borrower will use the resources; and thirdly, the lender's inability to verify the magnitude of the returns –  
once the investment returns have been realized. See ibid 
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are most beneficial to microfinance clients in rural areas) still persist.  According to CARE,6 
some of the reasons why past efforts involving group linkage has been quite challenging 
include not only the fact that products have been inappropriate to meet the needs of group 
members,  but  also  other  factors  embracing  a  lack  of  consideration  by  linkages  of  the 
structure  or  operating  principles  of  savings  groups,  as  well  as  a  lack  of  unanimous 
agreements between group members.
The aims and objectives of this study includes investigating how linkages, both direct and 
facilitating linkages, can benefit microfinance institutions in Africa – and particularly countries 
such as the Central Africa Republic, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Somalia, where the 
Savings Group Outreach involvement  is particularly low when compared to other African 
countries. The study also illustrates ways and means whereby group lending and other more 
recent  innnovative methods used by micro lenders to secure repayments could increase 
their desired effects. Furthermore, the study  incorporates the role of regulation in achieving 
the  desired  effects  of  microfinance  –  in  particular,  in  respect  of  asymmetric  information 
(agency problems), as well as in mitigating risks emanating from the lack of collaterals in 
microfinance.  
Incentives which are aimed at encouraging formal and less formal institutions to engage on a 
greater scale, in direct and facilitating linkage arrangements should focus on practices which 
would facilitate better corporate governance measures. Such incentives including shares or 
stock  options  for  the  Board  and  management  of  these  institutions  –  since  results  from 
empirical  based  research  have  revealed  that  such  agents  are  more  likely  to  serve  the 
interests of the principal better where their interests are tied up in the firm's shares. Such 
incentives, however, should be long term based – rather than short term since greater risks 
may be taken by such agents where they are compensated and rewarded on a short term 
basis.
This  study limits  its  scope  to  a  brief  jurisdictional  analysis  through  a  case  study  which 
highlights  scenarios  and  situations  involving  India,  Mali,  Indonesia,  The  Phillippines, 
Honduras  and  Costa  Rica.  Hence  further  suggestions  for  research  could  embrace  a 
jurisdictional  analysis  which  paves  the  way  for  a  more  detailed  comparative  analysis 
between  these  jurisdictions.  Such  comparative  analysis  could  also  incorporate  empirical 
based results which would facilitate a basis for international comparisons.
Furthermore,  owing to  the extant  literature  on the topic,  as well  as findings which have 
revealed that low income clients would rather build and consolidate on assets which help in 
reducing risk before they start incurring debt, micro savings has been focused on. Very little 
reference has been made to micro insurance – hence this area is strongly recommended as 
a  suggested  future  research  area  in  considering  its  impact  and  importance  to  rural 
inhabitants in their quest to obtain micro credit facilities. Such literature will be considered 
under the following section.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
As highlighted in the previous section, even though such innovations as group lending and 
financial  linkages  have  gone a huge  way to  address underlying issues  in  microfinance, 
several inefficiencies in the form of high transaction costs (and a proper understanding of 
what resources and products are most beneficial to microfinance clients in rural areas) still 
persist. This section aims to address issues which have contributed to inefficiencies which, in 
turn, have accentuated the difficulties and challenges faced by rural inhabitants in gaining 
access to microfinance facilities. Further, the section aims to contribute to the literature on 
the current topic by proposing new schemes and arrangements whereby such innovations 
6
6
(CARE, 2011: 39). See also Labie,1998  and McDonald, 2013.
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as group lending and financial linkages could be optimised and implemented with greater 
efficiency as well as with the aim of generating more beneficial results.
2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks
Micro finance is defined as banking and/or financial services which are targeted at low-and-
moderate  income  businesses  or  households  –  including  the  provision  of  credit.7 A 
microfinance institution is also considered to be a financial institution which could be a non 
profit  organisation,  regulated  financial  institution  or  commercial  bank  which  provides 
microfinance products and services to low- income clients.8 
Implementing  case  study  methods, Pagura  and  Kirsten  (2006)PPagura  and  Kirsten 
(2006)agura and Kirsten (2006))  embarked upon the quest to improve an understanding of 
financial linkages which is aimed at improving rural access to savings, insurance, money 
transfer and payment services, as well as credit.9
Over the past recent years, an increasing number of formal institutions have entered into 
and engaged themselves in collaborative relationships with less formal institutions.  Such 
relationships could be based on direct financial linkages and facilitating linkages.
Direct financial linkages are considered to be linkages between financial institutions whose 
main  purpose of  the  linkage  is  to  help  less formal  institutions  diversify  their  sources of 
funding10 whilst  facilitating linkages are linkages between institutions in which the formal 
institutions hires the less formal institutions to act on its behalf. Cases which were used by 
Pagura and Kirsten to illustrate such collaborative relationships include those from:11
• India (ICICI Bank, India's second largest commercial bank's partnership with MFIs in 
several unique ways to extend credit directly to Self Help Groups in rural areas);
•  Mali (where the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole, BNDA, is said to 
have a long history of serving less formal institutions through bulk loans and lines of 
credit  as  well  as  savings  accounts  to  help  institutions   address  cash  flow  and 
portfolio expansion projects.
• Indonesia: Where the Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPD) is acredited with playing a 
significant parenting role for customary village banks (LPDs) through the provision of 
services which include staff training, monitoring, as well as supervisory services. The 
7
7
(African Development Bank,  2006 : iii)
8
8
ibid
9
9
(Pagura and Kirsten, page 3 of 15). According to them, „successful cases in Bolivia, Costa Rica,  
Honduras, India, Kenya, Mali,  Peru, the Phillippines, Rwanda and Tanzania were selected because of the  
following factors:
- Such cases demonstrated success in expanding access to under-served rural market segments;
- They were based on cost covering principles or had clear exit strategies (if they were externally supported);
- They had been in existence for two or more years
- They added to the diversity of linkages types.“see ibid at page 4
10
1
See ibid at page 5
11
For an in-depth analysis of case studies on these countries, see ibid at page 8
____________________________________________________________________________________________
*Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University South Africa Corresponding author:  
Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com;
 
BPD is also involved in providing LPDs with savings and loans services which are 
aimed at assisting smaller institutions in managing their liquidity more effectively.
• The Phillippines: Where  government owned apex organisation“ PCFC, is involved in 
a partnership with several microfinance actors through the provision of wholesale 
credit and training to such institutions.
• Honduras: Covelo, a private first and second tier organisation“ provides loans and 
lines of credit in bulk quantities, to MFIs as well as contributes immensely in the 
consolidation  of  internal  systems  and  controls  which  are  aimed  improving  self-
regulation mechanisms. 
• Costa Rica: Where the promotion of the incorporation of village banks in the late 
1990s by Finca-Costa Rica, a move which was instrumental in paving the way for all 
units in the network to establish relationships with commercial lines of credit  and 
other financial services, is highlighted.
According to Atkinson et al,12 Savings treatments  also  generate  faster  pay-down  of  debt 
and   weakly   better   overall   repayment  performance,   suggesting   that   simultaneous 
savings  and  borrowing  can  be  complementary activities.  They also make reference to a 
theoretical  model  which illustrates that  the  simultaneous  provision  of  debt  and  a 
selfcommitment  savings   products  helps  a   greater   fraction   of   the   population   to 
eventually  escape  a debt-financed equilibrium.
It is also recommended by McDonald13 that there should be a greater emphasis should be 
placed on the non-loan aspects of microfinance - such aspects including both financial and 
non-financial services. 
2.2 Global and Jurisdictional Challenges Encountered by Microfinance
As highlighted under the introductory section, basic issues underlying the impediments and 
challenges  faced  in  microfinance  relate  particularly  to  those  presented  by  risk  and 
asymmetric  information.  Other  challenges  which  are  more  jurisdiction-specific,  and  with 
particular respect to microfinance in Africa, include:14
− The absence of strong retail capacity in microfinance institutions (this being 
considered to be the single largest constraint in the expansion of outreach of 
financial services to the poor in Africa;
− Extension of access to financial services to the remotest of rural areas in a cost 
effective manner;
− The  impression  that  microfinance  is  a  social  system  of  resource  transfers  to 
beneficiaries at subsidized interest levels, rather than a part of the financial sector – 
such impression being considered as an explanatory factor to why national enabling 
environments still restrict MFIs from transferring and moving savings;  
− Infrastructure required for microfinance – such infrastructure including training 
services and facilities, information technologies, credit bureaus.
Given the relatively low Savings Group Outreach involvement in countries such as the CAR, 
Eritrea,  Guinea  Bissau,  Nigeria  and  Somalia,  where  the  Savings  Group  Outreach 
involvement (see Table 1) is particularly low when compared to other African countries, it can 
12
1
(Atkinson et al,2012). Also see Rahman, 2003 and Tchouassi 2011
13
(McDonald, 2013:pages 95 and 96)
14
(African Development Bank,  2006: vii). Also see Ahlin et al , 2008, 2010)
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generally be inferred that there are huge problems and challenges faced in microfinance as 
regards access to microfinance facilities by rural clients.
As well as providing the explanation why more than 80% of all households in developing 
countries  do  not  have  access  to  institutional  banking  services  because  they  lack  the 
collateral  to  secure  loans  from  formal  financial  institutions,  Okpara also  adds  that, 
empirically, there are four major critical factors inhibiting the performance of banks in Nigeria 
and these are:15
− Undue Interference from Board Members
− Political Crises
− Undercapitalization
− Fraudulent Practices
Further as documented by the Central Bank of Nigeria, despite decades of public provision 
and direction of provision of micro credit, policy orientation, and the entry of new players, the 
supply of microfinance in Nigeria is still inadequate in relation to demand – suggesting that 
there is some inefficiency in microfinance operations in Nigeria due to some institutional 
inadequacies  such  as  undercapitalization,  inefficient  management  and  regulatory  and 
supervisory loopholes.16 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY
The  research  adopts  a  predominantly  analytical,  qualitative  approach,  as  well  as 
comparative approach in arriving at the results and findings of the study, and also  in drawing 
conclusions and recommendations for further study. The section, immediately following the 
introduction, considers economic theories as well as other literature on the study which have 
shaped the present literature on the topic. Not only does it aim to explore why there is still an 
existing gap  in  the  literature,namely,  why  many rural  parts  in  Africa  have  no  access  to 
microfinance facilities, it also proposes a means whereby such a gap can be mitigated or 
eliminated.  It  will  have  recourse  to  present  innovations  in  microfinance,  as  well  as 
incorporate the economic theories discussed in the section in proposing a scheme which 
should assist in mitigating (if not totally eliminating) the present gaps in the literature. The 
approach adopted in the study will then be considered before the findings and conclusions to 
the study are arrived at.
15
1
(Okpara, 2009:  page 5 of 15) and Okpara 2010
16
Adeyemi  (2008) Central Bank of Nigeria Bullion, 32(1) 26-34; cited in Ibid . See also Ghosh and 
Debraj 1997
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Table 1. Savings groups outreach
Source: CARE, CARE-Access-Africa-Closing-the-Gap-2011 Microfinance in Africa: State of the Sector 
Report at page 12
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4. ECONOMIC THEORIES UNDERLYING CHALLENGES FACED IN MICROFINANCE: 
PRINCIPAL  AGENT  RELATIONSHIP,  ASYMMETRIC  INFORMATION  AND  THE 
PROBLEM OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Agency theory explains a mismatch of resources and abilities. (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005:47)
This section is aimed at addressing how such a mismatch of resources and abilities can be 
addressed.  It  will  also  seek to  illustrate  how the above-mentioned components,  namely, 
principal  agent  relationship,  asymmetric information,  and the issue relating to incomplete 
contracts are linked. Asymmetric information being a feature of many agency relationships 
and necessitating a role of monitoring on the part of the principal. If the contracts between a 
principal and the agent were designed in such a way that it was a complete17 contract, it 
would reduce the scope at which the agent is encouraged to act in ways which support his 
personal interests and goals. However, since a degree of flexibility is required in the design 
of such contracts, it is inevitable that they end up being incomplete. Even in formal financial 
institutions where regular monitoring and regulation is carried out, principal agency problems 
arising from incomplete contracts still arise. For this reason it is vital to incorporate some 
elements of such formalised institutions, namely monitoring and regulation, into the activities 
of less formalised institutions. Hence, this section considers exclusively how regulation could 
be better incorporated into microfinance via formal institutions.
As highlighted under the introductory section, the issue of asymmetric information is a very 
probable and likely characteristic of microfinance institutions in Africa given the fact most 
microfinance activities revolve round the informal sector – hence the likelihood that such 
activities will be subject to monitoring, enforcement and sanctions are very low. Furthermore, 
in the absence of monitoring, supervision and enforcement, certain consequences, namely 
those highlighted in the previous section, that is, undercapitalization, fraudulent practices, 
inefficient management and regulatory and supervisory loopholes, are likely and inevitable 
consequences.
Regulation is therefore to be regarded as a necessary and vital component which should be 
incorporated into the design of microfinance activities and contracts. Another common and 
recurring  challenge  faced  by  many  financial  institutions  –  which  has  deterred  such 
institutions from engaging themselves in microfinance activities in rural areas, relates to high 
transaction  costs.  The  relatively  high  cost  of  lending  in  rural  areas  is  attributed  to  low 
population densities combined with low loan volume, poor transportation and communication 
facilities – which make unit delivery costs very high for small financial transactions18 as well 
as for larger institutions that frequently operate in urban areas.
Hence if regulation is to be incorporated into microfinance via formal institutions, it should be 
done through a vehicle and design which is not only aimed at facilitating greater monitoring, 
enforcement  and  supervision  within  the  process  but  aimed  at  cost  reduction  for  such 
institutions involved – be they  formal or less formal institutions – particularly in rural areas.
17
1
It is frequently argued that the principal agent problem would not arise if it were possible to write a 
complete contract – however it is also added that complete contracts are unfeasible since it is impossible to  
foresee or describe all future contingencies. (Maher and Andersson, 1999: 6)
18
As a result, it is not worth the substantial investment required to move into rural areas – as regards  
such larger  institutions,  and for  this reason,  in  many African countries,  the providers  of  rural  finance are  
smaller locally based institutions. (African Development Bank, 2006:6) See also Brandsma and Hart, 2001 and 
Duflos et al  2013
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An institutional arrangement and design which would facilitate the reduction of transaction 
costs for those institutions involved would not only help incorporate greater efficiency into the 
process,  but  should  also provide clients  with a  wider  range of  products  and services to 
choose from – products  and services which  would,  more importantly,  meet  their  needs. 
Furthermore,  the  design  should  be  targeted  at  incorporating  regulation,  monitoring  and 
supervisory  activities  at  minimal  cost  for  those  institutions  involved.  Since  information 
asymmetries are usually a typical feature of principal agent relationships, it is to be expected 
that  some  degree  of  monitoring  will  be  necessary  –  particularly  given  the  presence  of 
externalities.
Theories and concepts relating to adverse selection and moral hazard have commonalities 
owing to the fact that risk is inherent in both. Adverse selection, an economical phenomenon 
which is said to occur when banks cannot easily determine which customers are likely to be 
more  risky  than  others  (hence  preferring  to  charge  riskier  customers  more  than  safer 
customers in order to compensate for the probability of default), is also considered to be 
instrumental in frequently driving safer customers out of the credit market – since the bank is 
not certain of who is who and in the process, raises interest rates for everyone.19
Another phenomenon, which occurs where bank clients are prone to take higher risks with 
their  investments  –  especially  owing  to  the  fact  that  they  are  insured,  which  is  also 
highlighted  by  Armendáriz  de  Aghion  and  Morduch20,  is  moral  hazard.  Such  problems 
attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection, according to Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, could be potentially eliminated if banks were able to engage in affordable means 
of gathering and evaluating information on their clients, as well as enforcing contracts.21
Given  the  major  challenges  presented  by  the  inability  of  some  microfinance  clients  to 
present collaterals, and the level of risk this presents to micro lenders, micro savings should 
constitute the primary basis of providing microfinance to any rural client who cannot provide 
collateral to obtain microfinance in the first instance.
Such an affordable means of gathering and evaluating information on their clients, as well as 
enforcing  contracts,  could  be  achieved  through  the  arrangement  of  direct  or  facilitating 
linkages between formal and less formal institutions. In this sense, an allocation of resources 
can be achieved in such a way which is aimed at maximising efficiency as well as minimising 
costs.  Such  an  arrangement/scheme  (which  will  be  referred  to  as  the  Micro  Savings 
Requirement Scheme) is introduced as follows:
5. THE DESIGN OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN FORMAL AND LESS FORMAL 
FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE MICRO SAVINGS REQUIREMENT SCHEME
Where a client has been saving with an institution for at least three years and is capable of 
demonstrating a steady and acceptable level and source of income with such an institution, 
preferably,  a  less  formal  unregulated  institution  such  as  self  help  groups,  farmers' 
organisation,  women's organisations,  savings banks and NGOs, such a client  should be 
compensated in form of an incentive – such incentive being provided by the institution which 
will  eventually serve as microlender or provide a greater proportion of  the micro lending 
19
1
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005:7)
20
2
Ibid 
21
See ibid at page 8
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funds (usually the more formal institution will  be expected to provide more funding). The 
incentives could assume the form of financial backing – that is, an assurance that by saving 
with the less formal institution or bank, such clients would earn the prospects or possibility of 
getting the required microfinance after the three year period (or agreed period).
Naturally, the savings generated after the three year period should constitute a reasonable 
and acceptable percentage of the credit that will be eventually granted by the micro lender. 
In  such  cases,  linkages  between institutions  –  be  it  through  direct  linkage  or  facilitated 
linkage, plays a huge and important role since collaboration between formal and less formal 
institutions also provides an efficient means of diversifying client risks.
Where a client has retained a steady flow of savings over a desired and stipulated period of 
time with one of the institutions involved in the direct or facilitated linkage collaboration (such 
institution preferably being the less formal institution for instance, a village bank or savings 
club), the more formal institution should offer the guarantee of a grant of microfinance facility 
provided the savings generated over  the required minimum period (with  the less formal 
institution) constitutes an acceptable ratio which is considered reasonable enough for the 
more formal institution to offer such guarantee in granting the required micro credit facility to 
the client.
The more formal institution is also able to incorporate the previously lacking supervision and 
monitoring activities into the process once the minimum required savings period has expired. 
This also incorporates a degree of cost efficiency into the process since, initially, when the 
client was saving, the less formal institution (where the client had his/her savings) had less 
reasons to monitor customer activities. This being the case since greater risk was borne by 
the client (and not the less formal bank/institution) in placing savings with the bank.
However, with the expiration of the savings period and the fulfillment of conditions required 
to secure the grant of microfinance facility, the risk borne is now transferred to the more 
formal bank/institution – who in such a case is most likely to provide a greater proportion of 
the credit  facility.  Hence there will  be greater  need for  the formal  institution to  instigate 
monitoring activities.
The less formal institution is not obliged to commit more resources (hence incurring costs) 
towards  monitoring  activities  and  the  more  formal  institution  will  simply  be  engaged  in 
activities  which it  was  previously well  equipped and specialised to  engage in  –  thereby 
ensuring that no extra costs are borne by the less formal institution (in engaging in additional 
monitoring  responsibilities)  –  and  therefore  ensuring  that  a  more  efficient  allocation  of 
resources  is  facilitated  and  that  an  incident  resulting  in  a  „mismatch  of  resources  and 
abilities“ is reduced.
In determining the amount of risk that can be accepted or borne by such an institution, it 
could have regard to the amount of credit facility granted: relative to amount of savings in 
client's account, the loan repayments/loan repayment period, and other factors which could 
serve as indicators of the level of risk being assumed. 
The importance of designing a contract which accurately and appropriately reflects all that 
has been highlighted in this section so far, cannot be over emphasised. Furthermore, good 
corporate and governance measures and practices will  need to be incorporated into the 
relationship between the formal and less formal financial institutions if they are to effectively 
and efficiently undertake and execute their tasks and responsibilities. 
Governance  structures,  according  to  Maher  and  Andersson,  can  be  regarded  as  a 
mechanism  for  making  decisions  that  have  not  been  specified  in  the  initial  contract.22 
22
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Furthermore they add that,23 corporate governance not only constitutes a key element of 
improving microeconomic efficiency, it strongly influences resource allocation, as well as the 
behaviour  and  performance  of  firms,  innovative  activity,  entrepreneurship,  and  the 
development of an active SME sector.24
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch also argue that the inefficiencies of adverse selection 
can be mitigated through group lending.
− The Grameen group lending contract works very differently than a standard banking 
contract for small business. In a standard relationship, the borrower gives the bank 
collateral as security, gets a loan from the bank, invests the capital to generate a 
return, and finally pays the loan back with interest. Since Grameen clients are often 
too poor to be able to offer collateral, the Grameen contract takes advantage of the 
client's close ties within their community. To take advantage of those relationships, 
the loan contract involves groups of customers, not individuals acting on their own. 
The groups form voluntarily, and, while loans are made to individuals within groups, 
all members are expected to support the others when difficulties arise.
 
Even though group lending may serve as a greater means of enforcing repayment and the 
fulfillment  of  contractual  terms  and  obligations,  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  a 
collaboration  between  formal  and  less  formal  institutions  (through  direct  and  facilitating 
linkages) within the context  of  clients who had no collaterals and initially had to start  up 
through micro savings (in order to obtain the required microfinance facility), are definitely 
greater.  Furthermore,  the  establishment  of  group  lending  arrangements,  whilst  also 
incorporating the joint liability condition and whilst facilitating enforcement, does not entirely 
or substantially address the issue relating to asymmetric information and agency problems. 
In  addition  to  the  Micro-Savings  Requirement  Scheme  which  has  been  illustrated  and 
described in this section, other features of the Grameen group lending contract could also be 
incorporated into the contract between formal and less formal institutions – that is group 
lending and the joint liability condition. However, this would not constitute a pre-requisite for 
the Micro-Savings requirement. Individuals should be free and eligible to undertake such 
schemes.  The  difference  between  the  Micro-Savings  Requirement  Scheme  which 
incorporates features of group lending and the joint liability condition and the Grameen group 
lending contract would be the added advantage which the former has over the latter. That is, 
whilst the Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme (which incorporates features of group lending 
and the joint liability condition) offers the added benefit of the client offering some collateral 
(in the form of savings), a collateral is lacking in the Grameen group lending contract.
CARE also emphasises the importance of microfinance institutions understanding the needs 
of those very poor people, most of whom live in hard-to-reach places.25 The importance of 
loan terms being adequately tailored to meet the intended use of the loan, principals which 
 
This  being  particularly  the  case  since  many  contracts  are  incomplete  contracts.  (Maher  and 
Andersson, 1999:6)
23
2
Ibid at page 4 
24
Poor  corporate  governance mechanisms in certain  OECD countries,  it  is  further  argued,  „have 
proved, in part, to be a major impediment to improving the competitiveness of firms. It is also added that better 
corporate governance both within OECD and non OECD countries is capable of generating higher levels of  
economic growth. See ibid
25
 See (CARE, 2011:39)
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are not too large, loan terms which are not too short, installment payment systems which fit 
the cash flow of the investment, are also emphasised.26
A number of  reasons also proposed as contributory  to  why past  efforts  aimed at  group 
linkage has been so challenging include the fact that products have been inappropriate in 
meeting the needs of group members, linkage has not taken into account the structure or 
operating  principles  of  savings  groups,  and  that  unanimous  agreement  among  group 
members to link, has been lacking.27
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The following conclusions and findings were derived by Bhagat and Bolton in accentuating 
their contribution to the literature on corporate governance:28
− Better governance, as measured by GIM (the Gompers, Ishii,  and Metrick)29 and 
BCF30 (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell) indices, stock ownership of board members, 
and Chief Executive Officer chair separation, is significantly positively correlated with 
better and subsequent operating performance;
− That implications  of the above-mentioned finding on corporate governance include 
namely, the need for focus on stock ownership of board members in the aim and 
efforts  to  improve  corporate  governance  –  since  in  their  opinion,  corporate 
governance is  not  only positively correlated to future  operating performance, but 
also the probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing firms.
It may then be asked or questioned: What are the rewards or compensation which would 
serve as incentives for those formal and less formal financial institutions to engage in direct 
or facilitating linkage arrangements aimed at assisting rural inhabitants in gaining access to 
micro  credit  facilities  –  and  with  particular  reference  to  the  proposed  Micro  Savings 
Requirement Scheme?
As highlighted earlier on in the section, less formal institutions gain advantages in that the 
more formal institutions undertake monitoring and supervisory activities after the savings 
period  has  expired  –  thus  incorporating  greater  monitoring  and  enforcement  into  the 
process. The more formal institutions should also benefit from better corporate structure and 
governance  arrangements  -  through  their  collaboration  with  the  less  formal  institutions. 
26
2
ibid
27
 ibid. See also United Nations, 2000
28
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008:271)
29
 GIM G Index:  “The G-Index  is  constructed  from data  compiled  by  the  Investor  Responsibility  
Research Center ("IRRC"), as described in Gompers, Ishii,  Metrick (2003). A firm's score is based on the  
number of shareholder rights-decreasing provisions a firm has. The index ranges from a feasible low of 0 to a 
high of 24. A high G-Score is associated with weak shareholder rights, and a low G-Score is associated with 
strong shareholder rights. (Bhagat and Bolton, 2006: 34) 
30
3
 BCF E-Index: The E-Index is constructed from IRRC data as described in Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell  
(2004). It uses a 6-provision subset of the GIndex. The index ranges from a feasible low of 0 to a high of 6;a  
high score is associated with weak shareholder rights and alow score is associated with strong shareholder 
rights. (Bhagat and Bolton, 2006: 34) 
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There may, initially,  appear to be some sceptism as regards this view – however greater 
accountability  might  be  incorporated  into  the  corporate  governance  process  where  two 
institutions (both the formal and less formal) are involved. Based on the empirical results of 
Bhagat  and Bolton,31 as previously  discussed, such improved better  governance,  should 
generate better performance results, hence greater profitability.
Even  assuming  that  the  empirical  results  of  Bhagat  and  Bolton  are  not  taken  into 
consideration, and that a collaboration between the less formal and formal institution (via 
direct  or  facilitating  linkages)  does  not  improve  the  governance  structure  of  the  formal 
institution, the formal financial institution would still benefit from the process if it generates 
corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)  reports  through  which  the  general  public  and  its 
extended stakeholders are able to view the positive contribution being made by the firm in 
improving the lives of those living in poverty through better access to microfinance facilities 
(micro savings and micro credit facilities inclusively).
6.1 Recent Developments in Microfinance
It is increasingly being acknowledged that microfinance and the provision of micro credit may 
not  always  offer  the  best  solution  in  addressing  the  needs  of  the  poor.  Further,  it  is 
maintained that other strategies may serve to better address the issues of social exclusion 
and poverty.32 According to Rosset Cambier, a number of examples have been provided of 
combined microfinance schemes which have very low levels of outreach and are limited in 
their services owing to geographical, cultural or financial reasons.33 Further, he adds that 
there  is  need  for  more  thorough  and  formative  evaluation  approach  to  combined 
microfinance evaluation – which builds on lessons learned dealing with combined product 
design and implementation.34
Emerging trends also reveal that many micro lenders are adopting more flexible approaches 
in obtaining collaterals – particularly given the need and urgency to work more effectively in 
not so densely populated areas. Such trends include:35
− Progressive Lending : The practice of promising larger and larger loans to groups 
and individuals in good standing. It is also considered to enable the lender to test 
borrowers with small loans at the start in order to screen out the worst prospects 
before expanding the magnitude of the loan. 
− Public repayments
− Repayment schedules with weekly or monthly installments
− Targeting of women
31
3
 (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008:271)
32
(Rosset Cambier, 2004:21)
33
ibid
34
Ibid at page 22
35
Flexible approaches to collateral where what matters most, is the value that the customer attaches 
to losing the item – rather than the value that the lender expects to recover from selling the item. (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005: 119,125 and 142)
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7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As indicated under the introductory section, the research will adopt a predominantly based 
qualitative and analytical approach in arriving at the results and findings of the study, as well 
as in drawing a conclusion and recommendations for further study. Even though references 
will  be  made  to  empirical  research,  an  analytical,  as  well  as  a  comparative  holistic 
perspective will primarily constitute the basis of the results and conclusion to the study.
It  will  initially  adopt  a  holistic/global  based  approach  which  will  take  into  consideration 
approaches which have been adopted in other jurisdictions where similar issues have been 
addressed  and  whose  outcomes  have  proved  successful.  The  results  generated  from 
comparing results from different jurisdictions will then be applied at a more restrictive level, 
namely, on a regional basis, before it is narrowed down to a country specific basis.
In adopting a holistic and global based approach, and incorporating the results from a case 
study,36 countries which have been selected and considered in this study are as follows:
• India  (where  partnership  was  undertaken  with  MFIs  in  several  unique  ways  to 
extend credit directly to Self Help Groups in rural areas);
•  Mali (where  a long history of serving less formal institutions through bulk loans and 
lines of credit as well as savings accounts to help institutions  address cash flow and 
portfolio expansion projects, considered).
• Indonesia: Where the assumption of a significant parenting role for customary village 
banks  (LPDs)  through  the  provision  of  services  which  include  staff  training, 
monitoring, as well as supervisory services, is taken into account. 
• The  Phillippines:  Where  government  owned  apex  organisation,  is  involved  in  a 
partnership  with  several  microfinance  actors  through  the  provision  of  wholesale 
credit and training to such institutions.
• Honduras: Covelo, a private first and second tier organisation provides loans and 
lines of credit in bulk quantities, to MFIs as well as contributes immensely in the 
consolidation  of  internal  systems  and  controls  which  are  aimed  improving  self-
regulation mechanisms. 
• Costa Rica: Where the promotion of the incorporation of village banks in the late 
1990s by Finca-Costa Rica, a move which was instrumental in paving the way for all 
units in the network to establish relationships with commercial lines of credit  and 
otehr financial services, is highlighted.
The above results derived from the case study by Pagura and Kirsten are those which have 
been  selected  and  taken  into  account  and  applied  at  a  narrower  level   in  drawing 
conclusions  and  recommendations  for  this  research  study.  Furthermore,  more  recent 
developments, theoretical considerations (theories) and emerging trends will be incorporated 
into conclusions and recommendations derived for the study.
8. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
According to CARE,37 the products offered by MFIs to poor people are often not well suited 
to meet their needs. Furthermore, it is highlighted that MFIs often offer credit to those who 
36
3
 Pagura and Kirsten, page 3 of  15. According to them, successful cases in Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, India, Kenya, Mali, Peru, the Phillippines, Rwanda and Tanzania were selected owing to specified  
factors. The countries have been narrowed down in the present study.
37
(CARE, 2011: 9)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
*Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University South Africa Corresponding author:  
Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com;
 
are unable to afford such and who would rather save than have access to such credit.38 
Findings from CARE also revealed that  such low income clients  would  rather  build  and 
consolidate on assets which help in reducing risk before they start incurring debt.39
The beneficial features of the Micro Savings Requirement Scheme can also be illustrated 
through the collaborative arrangements between the formal and less formal institution via 
direct or facilitated linkages whose benefits have been illustrated – according to a case study 
which  involved  various  jurisdictions  such  as  India,  Costa  Rica,  the  Phillippines,  Mali, 
Honduras, Indonesia. Such benefits include:
− extending credit directly to Self Help Groups in rural areas
− assisting  institutions  in addressing  cash flow and portfolio expansion projects
−  the  provision  of  services  which  include  staff  training,  monitoring,  as  well  as 
supervisory services
− the provision of wholesale credit and training to such involved institutions
− contributing immensely in the consolidation of internal systems and controls which 
are aimed improving self-regulation mechanisms. 
The above mentioned benefits,  along with other benefits inherent  in the proposed Micro 
Savings Requirement Scheme will be of immense benefit to microfinance in countries where 
access to microfinance in rural areas is severely restricted – and particularly in countries 
such as the CAR, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Somalia, where statistics reveal that 
the  Savings  Group  Outreach  involvement  (see  Table  1  above)  is  particularly  low when 
compared to other African countries.
Given the benefits of microfinance - as well as the needs and demands of those who are not 
able to afford collaterals and who would not  wish to incur  debt  (before consolidating on 
assets which can be used in mitigating risk), the Micro Savings Requirement Scheme has 
been proposed.  For  micro  lenders,  it  offers  a  more flexible  approach and alternative  to 
obtaining a collateral whilst also incorporating the options of having features of group lending 
and the joint liability conditions.
This study has attempted to investigate how linkages, both direct and facilitating linkages, 
can benefit microfinance institutions in Africa – and particularly countries where the Savings 
Group Outreach involvement is particularly low when compared to other African countries. 
This study has also illustrated ways and means whereby group lending and other more 
recent  innnovative methods used by micro lenders to secure repayments could increase 
their  desired  effects.  Furthermore,  the  study  has  illustrated  how  regulation  could  be 
harnessed in achieving certain desired effects of microfinance – in particular, in respect of 
addressing  asymmetric  information  (agency  problems),  as  well  as  in  mitigating  risks 
emanating from the lack of collaterals in microfinance.  
As  highlighted  under  the  introductory  section,  further  suggestions  for  research  could 
embrace  a  jurisdictional  analysis  which  paves  the  way for  a  more  detailed  comparative 
analysis  between  these  jurisdictions.  Such  comparative  analysis  could  also  incorporate 
empirical  based results which would  facilitate a  basis  for international  comparisons.  The 
largely informal sectors operating in rural areas, as well as inadequate levels of monitoring 
and the existence of asymmetric information has made it more necessary for regulation to 
play a role. Through the proposed Micro Savings Requirement Scheme, this scheme has not 
only provided a means for assisting those in rural areas to secure collaterals more easily, but 
38
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ibid
39
ibid
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also  introduced  arrangements  whereby  greater  formalism  could  be  introduced  into  the 
informal sector.
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APPENDIX
Typology of case study linkages 
Source: Pagura, M. and  Kirsten, M. (2006) Formal Informal Financial Linkages – Lessons From Developing Countries at page 6
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